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I. INTRODUCTION
A buyer and a seller arrange for the sale of goods. In order to
provide the seller security for the buyer's payment, the parties agree
to use a letter of credit.' Upon the buyer's application, the buyer's
1. Letters of credit originated and developed in the realm of international trade. B.
KOZOLCHYK, COMMERCIAL LETTERS OF CREDIT IN THE AMERICAS 3-43 (1966); see
Kozolchyk, The Legal Nature of the Irrevocable Letter of Credit, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 395-400
(1965). Letters of credit were probably first used in 575 B.C. W. WARD & H. HARFIELD,
BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 145 (4th ed. 1958).
Traditionally, the letter of credit facilitated transactions between unfamiliar parties of
distant countries. Foreign trade is naturally more risky than domestic trade because of
variations in commercial standards, laws, customs or duties, governmental regulations, and
currencies. Understandably, in the early years of international commerce, a seller may have
been hesitant to rely on the credit of a buyer he did not know. Likewise, a buyer may have
been unwilling to pay for goods sold by an unknown seller until they had been delivered.
Despite all our modern transactional conveniences, similar fears still exist today. A letter of
credit, issued by a bank with a readily discernable reputation, solves this common problem.
Simply stated, a letter of credit authorizes the party to whom it is issued (the seller) to draw a
draft up to a specified amount on the issuing bank. The bank agrees to pay the draft when it is
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bank issues a letter of credit for the benefit of the seller. The parties
agree that if the buyer defaults on the required payments, the seller
can collect on the letter of credit by presenting draft documents to the
buyer's bank. To complete the financial arrangement, the buyer exe-
cutes a promissory note in favor of the bank. This note, which equals
the amount of the letter of credit and carries the same expiration date,
presented. The effect is to substitute the bank's credit for that of the buyer, thereby assuring
the seller of payment.
Henry Harfield, a leading scholar in letter of credit law, found it "virtually impossible to
[define a letter of credit) in a manner that is both comprehensive and concise." H. HARFIELD,
LETTERS OF CREDIT 1 (1979). The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides:
(a) "Credit" or "letter of credit" means an engagement by a bank or other
person made at the request of a customer ... that the issuer will honor drafts or
other demands for payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the
credit. A credit may be either revocable or irrevocable. The engagement may be
either an agreement to honor or a statement that the bank or other person is
authorized to honor.
U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(a) (1978). Florida and Louisiana have modified section 5-103(l)(a) slightly
by changing the second sentence to read: "A credit shall clearly state whether it is revocable
or irrevocable and in the absence of such statement shall be presumed to be irrevocable." FLA.
STAT. § 675.103(1) (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-103(l)(a) (West 1985).
The UCC definition provides a broad standard guide to letters of credit. For a small
sampling of the extensive opinions construing the UCC definition of commercial letters of
credit, see Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776 (D. Conn. 1980); Baker v.
National Blvd. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021 (N.D. I11. 1975); Lewis State Bank v. Advance Mort-
gage Corp., 362 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Easton Tire Co. v. Farmers & Merchants
Bank, 642 S.W.2d 396 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Richards Elec. Supply Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 2
Ohio App. 3d 325, 441 N.E.2d 1130 (1981).
The Comptroller of the Currency's interpretation is less exact, but points to five elements
generally attributable to letters of credit:
(a) Each letter of credit should conspicuously state that it is a letter of credit or
be conspicuously entitled as such; (b) the bank's undertaking should contain a
specified expiration date or be for a definite term; (c) the bank's undertaking
should be limited in amount; (d) the bank's obligation to pay should arise only
upon the presentation of a draft or other documents as specified in the letter of
credit, and the bank must not be called upon to determine questions of fact or
law at issue between the account party and the beneficiary; (e) the bank's cus-
tomer should have an unqualified obligation to reimburse the bank for payments
made under the letter of credit.
12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1986); see also INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM
CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1974) (containing 50 articles defin-
ing letters of credit
An instrument need not state that it is a letter of credit to qualify as one. See First Am.
Nat'l Bank v. Alcorn, Inc., 361 So. 2d 481, 487 (Miss. 1978). In addition, an instrument may
be construed as a letter of credit even though the parties labeled it otherwise. See Toyota
Indust. Trucks v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 611 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1979).
Some scholars track the language of the UCC in defining letters of credit. See Murray,
Letters of Credit in Nonsale of Goods Transactions, 30 Bus. LAW. 1103 (1975). Those who do
not, offer definitions that are substantively consistent with the Code. See Katskee, The
Standby Letter of Credit Debate-The Case for Congressional Resolution, 92 BANKING L.J. 697
(1975); Megrah, Risk Aspects of the Irrevocable Documentary Credit, 24 ARiz. L. REV. 255
(1982).
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backs up the letter of credit. The letter of credit herein described is
called a "standby" letter of credit because the bank stands by until the
seller presents the proper documents or until the letter of credit
expires on a predetermined date.
Simple enough. Now let's add some real world facts. Assume
that the buyer defaults on his payments to the seller. The seller, hav-
ing protected himself from precisely this possibility turns to the bank
with documents in hand and requests payment on the letter of credit.
But assume that the bank has gone insolvent. Does the seller lose the
proceeds from his sale? In an effort to avoid the rough and tumble of
bankruptcy proceedings, the seller seeks salvation in a federal statute.
When read literally, the statute defines a standby letter of credit
backed by a promissory note as a deposit, which is insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The seller files a
claim with the FDIC, which refuses payment. Question: What result?
The Supreme Court was faced with this fact pattern in FDIC v.
Philadelphia Gear.2 Although the FDIC had never recognized such a
claim, two lower federal courts read the deposit statute literally and
ruled in favor of Philadelphia Gear,3 the seller in the above scenario.
The lower court decisions caused considerable concern, even panic,
among significant portions of the banking community, the industrial
development bond market, the FDIC and those who utilized standby
letters of credit in everyday business practice. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court reversed.
The Supreme Court's decision was correct; but in an effort to
avoid adverse effects on the banking industry and the industrial bond
market, and yet align the deposit statute with both congressional
intent and current commercial banking practice, the Court essentially
eliminated a statutory term that it only intended to narrow in scope.
This note will critique and attempt to clarify the holding and
rationale of the decision in Philadelphia Gear. The second section of
the note introduces the factual dispute in Philadelphia Gear. The
third section discusses the decisions of the lower courts. The next
section outlines the Supreme Court's opinion. The fifth section
describes the financial consequences that influenced, but were omitted
from, the Supreme Court's decision. The sixth section introduces and
2. 106 S. Ct. 1931 (1986).
3. The Philadelphia Gear Corporation is extensively integrated, both horizontally and
vertically. Its corporate parent is American Manufacturing Corporation. Its affiliates include
American Insurance Corporation Services, Limitorque Corporation (Virginia), American
Manufacturing Company, and Effector, Inc. Its nonwholly owned subsidiary is Philadelphia
Gear de Mexico, S.A. Brief for Petitioners at 2 n.l, FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 106 S.
Ct. 1931 (1986) (No. 84-1972).
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critically examines the Court's analysis in Philadelphia Gear. Part A
of this section addresses the conflict between potentially applicable
state and federal law. Part B critiques the Court's deference to the
FDIC's interpretation of the deposit statute. Finally, part C, using
letter of credit paradigms created by the authors, attempts to deter-
mine what types of financial instruments will trigger insurance protec-
tion. Section seven embodies the author's conclusion.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Orion Manufacturing Corporation (Orion), a producer of oil
pumping machinery, desired to purchase equipment used in the pro-
duction of pumping jacks from the Philadelphia Gear Corporation
(Philadelphia Gear), a trade supplier. In order to facilitate this trans-
action, Orion engaged the services of Penn Square Bank, N.A. (Penn
Square), a national banking association doing business in Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma. On April 23, 1981, upon Orion's application, Penn
Square issued a standby4 irrevocable letter of credit5 for the benefit of
4. A standby letter of credit may be defined as "[a]n instrument using the same
mechanism as the [ordinary letter) of credit but issued as a guarantee against default by one
party to the contract rather than a payment instrument-hence the expression standby....
The beneficiary is usually entitled to payment of the credit sum against presentation of a simple
demand to be paid." M. ROWE, LE'TTERS OF CREDIT 5 (1985). Standby letters should be
contrasted with traditional (also known as commercial or documentary) letters of credit and
guarantees:
A letter of credit (whether of the commercial or standby variety) is an
engagement by an issuer (almost always a bank) to a beneficiary (such as a seller
of goods).., that binds the issuing bank to honor drafts up to the amount of the
credit upon the beneficiary's presentment of the documents required by the
terms of the letter.
If a commercial letter is involved, the documents will normally include a bill
of lading and invoice; if a standby letter is involved, the key document will
probably be a certificate of default by the customer on the underlying obligation.
B. CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS § 8.2, at 8-5
(rev. ed. 1981) (footnote omitted).
Essentially, this means that in the traditional letter of credit paradigm involving the sale
of goods the parties have not yet executed the underlying sales contract. The bank's obligation
will not arise until the contract is performed and the beneficiary presents the proper documents
to the bank for payment. In contrast, the standby letter of credit is, to a large extent, an
existing obligation which does not require performance until the proper documentation is
presented. The standby letter of credit "represents [an] issuer's promise to pay on little more
than the beneficiary's certification of default," regardless of whether such default actually
occurred. Jarvis, Standby Letters of Credit-Issuer's Subrogation and Assignment Rights Part
H, 10 U.C.C. L.J. 38, 45 (1977).
There has been some confusion as to the distinction between standby letters of credit and
guarantees. Although both standby letters of credit and guarantees act as support mechanisms
for the credit of one party, only a guarantor is able to assert the defenses of the party whose
payment he backs. Kozolchyk, The Emerging Law of Standby Letters of Credit and Bank
Guarantees, 24 ARIZ L. REV. 319, 319 (1982). In addition, in a letter of credit transaction the
bank's obligation is independent of the buyer's obligation to pay for the goods. The bank must
[Vol. 41:357
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Philadelphia Gear.6
In return, Orion issued an unsecured promissory note in favor of
Penn Square. The promissory note was only intended to act as secur-
ity for the letter of credit. Both Orion and Penn Square understood
that Penn Square was not to demand, or expect, payment on the
promissory note unless Philadelphia Gear called upon Penn Square to
make payment under the letter of credit. 7 This understanding, how-
ever, was not mentioned anywhere on the face of the promissory note.
On July 5, 1982, the Comptroller of the Currency, declared Penn
pay merely upon the presentation of documents. The bank therefore is not directly responsible
to answer for the debt of another which is the traditional function of a guarantee. See L.
SIMPSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW ON SURETYSHIP 10 (1950).
The conceptual differences between the two instruments, while once a more significant
topic for legal discussion, have been basically settled and accepted in thought and practice. See
Campbell, Guarantees and the Suretyship Phases of Letters of Credit, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 175,
261 (1937). Today there is little support for the contention that a standby letter of credit is
nothing more than a guarantee. Verkuil, Bank Solvency and Guarantee Letters of Credit, 25
STAN. L. REV. 716, 725 (1973). Banks generally lack the statutory authority to guarantee the
debt of other parties. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982); see Harfield, The National Bank Act and Foreign
Trade Practices, 61 HARV. L. REV. 782, 788-89 (1948). An interpretive ruling by the Comp-
troller of the Currency, however, granted banks the authority to issue standby letters of credit.
12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1986); see supra note 1. For an examination of standby letters of credit and
specific legal problems arising from their use, see Arnold & Bransilver, The Standby Letter of
Credit-The Controversy Continues, 10 U.C.C. L.J. 272 (1978); Harfield, The Standby Letter of
Credit Debate, 94 BANKING L.J. 293 (1977); Katsker, The Standby Letter of Credit Debate-
The Case for Congressional Resolution, 92 BANKING L.J. 816 (1977); Verkuil, Letters of
Credit-Bank Solvency and Standby Letters of Credit: Lessons From the USNB Failure, 53
TUL. L. REV. 314 (1979); see also Regulation of Standby Letters of Credit: Hearings on S. 2347
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1976).
5. The letter of credit was in the amount of $145,200 and expired August 1, 1982.
Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 1131, 1133 (10th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1931
(1986). The letter of credit provided that Philadelphia Gear's "signed statement that [it had]
invoiced Orion Manufacturing Corporation and that [the] invoices [had] remained unpaid for
at least fifteen (15) days" and "cop[ies] of all invoices" must accompany drafts submitted to
Penn Square for payment. Id. The agreement further provided that "all invoices [would] be
verified for authenticity and payment with Orion Manufacturing Corporation," and that Penn
Square "agree[d] with drawers, endorsers and bona-fide holders of all drafts, drawn under and
in compliance with the terms of this credit, that such drafts [would] be duly honored upon
presentation to the drawer." Id. (emphasis added).
Penn Square, at the request of Philadelphia Gear, amended the letter of credit by deleting
the paragraph requiring that invoices be verified for authenticity, and added the following
language: "This credit shall be automatically reinstated from time to time for any sum or sums
up to $145,200 upon presentation of described documents. This credit and all reinstatements
are irrevocable and shall expire on August 1, 1982." Id. (emphasis added).
6. Id.
7. "Both Orion and Penn Square understood that nothing would be considered due on
this note nor would interest be charged unless and until Philadelphia Gear presented to Penn
Square the requisite documents detailed in the letter of credit, which it had not done at the
time of the bank's insolvency." Id. at 1134.
1986]
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Square insolvent.' Orion had not yet paid Philadelphia Gear on the
purchase of equipment. Two days later, on July 7, 1982, Philadelphia
Gear, through its remitting bank, submitted three complying9 docu-
mentary drafts to the FDIC as receiver, seeking payment on the
standby letter of credit. On July 22, 1982, Philadelphia Gear
presented five more drafts. In total, Philadelphia Gear presented
eight drafts having a total value of $724,728.50. The FDIC refused to
honor these drafts.' ° In a letter to Philadelphia Gear, the FDIC
stated that it "disaffirmed 'any and all' terms, provisions, responsibili-
ties or obligations that might otherwise exist" under the letter of
credit.'" The FDIC returned all drafts that Philadelphia Gear sub-
mitted under the letter of credit, and all drafts remained unpaid. Sub-
sequently, Philadelphia Gear brought suit against the FDIC, both as
receiver 12 and as insurer 3 of deposits,' 4 claiming that the letter of
credit was a "deposit" that was insured by the FDIC under 12 U.S.C.
§ 1813(l)(1).'5
8. A bank is considered "insolvent either when its liquidity is so low that it cannot pay its
debts; (i.e., a negative cash flow cannot be met) or when the market value of its assets reduced
by the costs of bankruptcy is less than the value of liabilities to its customers, computed under
the assumption that all such obligations will be met fully." S. MAISEL, RISK AND CAPITAL
ADEQUACY IN COMMERCIAL BANKS 21 (1981).
9. The district court found that the documents complied with the requirements of the
letter of credit. Philadelphia Gear, therefore, had satisfied the condition precedent for
payment on the letter of credit. Although Orion had apparently refused to make payment due
to insolvency, insolvency was not a prerequisite for presentation of the documentary drafts.
10. Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1133-34.
11. Id. at 1134.
12. The pertinent text of 12 U.S.C § 1821(c) reads:
Corporation as receiver:
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, whenever the Comptroller
of the Currency shall appoint a receiver other than a conservator of any insured
national bank, insured Federal Branch of a foreign bank, or insured District
bank, or of any noninsured National bank or District bank hereafter closed, he
shall appoint the [FDIC] receiver for such closed bank.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (1982).
13. See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m) (1982).
14. Philadelphia Gear sought judgment against the FDIC in its capacity as insurer for
$100,000 and for $624,728.50 in its capacity as receiver. Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1133.
15. Section 1813(1)(1) provides in pertinent part:
The term deposit means:
[Tihe unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held by a bank
in the usual course of business and ... which is evidenced by ... a letter of credit
... on which the bank is primarily liable: Provided, that, without limiting the
generality of the term "money or its equivalent", any such account or instrument
must be regarded as evidencing the receipt of the equivalent of money when
credited or issued in exchange for ... a promissory note upon which the person
obtaining any such credit or instrument is primarily or secondarily liable.
12 U.S.C. § 1813(l)(l) (1982).
[Vol. 41:357
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III. THE DECISIONS OF THE LOWER COURTS
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma 6 ruled in favor of Philadelphia Gear on all issues dealing
with deposit insurance and in favor of the FDIC as receiver on the
question of the total value of the letter of credit. 7 Both sides
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit addressed whether the standby letter of credit
was a deposit within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l)(1).' 8 The
FDIC made two arguments to support a finding that it was not.
First, the FDIC argued that Orion's promissory note was nonnegoti-
able and therefore of no value to the holder: 9 Orion had advanced no
money on the promissory note to Penn Square; the promissory note
did not represent an unconditional obligation to pay the face amount;
and Penn Square could not obtain value from the note by offsetting it
against Orion's other obligations, by selling it for approximately face
value, or by accelerating it because the note was contingent. 20
The Tenth Circuit disagreed. It held that negotiability, and ulti-
mately value, "must be determined from the face of the instrument
without regard to extraneous agreements."' 2' Accordingly, the court
tested for negotiability by looking at the face of the note only. The
face of the promissory note contained merely "standard terms."
Although the court acknowledged the understanding between Orion
and Penn Square and recognized that no money had been advanced, it
found that the note was negotiable on its face.
16. 587 F. Supp. 294 (W.D. Okla. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 751 F.2d 1131 (10th
Cir. 1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1931 (1986).
17. Because the face of the letter of credit was ambiguous, the district court valued the
letter at $145,200 rather than the larger sum (over $700,000) that Philadelphia Gear requested.
Id. at 299.
18. The court of appeals decided two collateral issues. First, the court held that
Philadelphia Gear could be considered the depositor entitled to receive deposit insurance
proceeds. Second, it held that the district court erred in awarding Philadelphia Gear
prejudgment interest from the FDIC in its capacity as insurer on the $100,000 deposit
insurance proceeds and from the FDIC in its capacity as receiver on the delayed dividend for
the excess. Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1133.
19. The Uniform Commercial Code requires that "[a]ny writing to be a negotiable
instrument within this Article must ... contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a
sum certain in money and no other promise, order, obligation or power given by the maker or
drawer except as authorized by this Article." U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(b) (1978). The FDIC argued
that the note was nonnegotiable because payment on it was conditioned on Philadelphia Gear's
presentation of the appropriate documents.
20. 751 F.2d at 1134.
21. Id. The court relied principally on a section of the Uniform Commercial Code which
provides that "a promise or order is not unconditional if the instrument ... states that it is
subject to or governed by any other agreement." U.C.C. § 3-105(2)(a) (1978); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12a, § 3-105(2)(a) (1963).
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Second, the FDIC asserted that the letter of credit was not one
on which Penn Square was "primarily" liable. It believed that the
"language in [section] 1813(l)(1) referring to letters of credit on which
the bank is primarily liable was intended to refer only to commercial
letters"22 and highlighted the differences between commercial letters
of credit and standby letters of credit.23 The Tenth Circuit, however,
was unpersuaded.24 In an opinion by Judge Logan, the court of
appeals held that "the transaction qualified as one in which 'money or
its equivalent' was issued in exchange for a promissory note." 25 As a
result, Philadelphia Gear was entitled to deposit insurance protection,
pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m), up to the $100,000 maximum limit
generally insured by the FDIC for any single depositor at a given
bank. The FDIC appealed.
IV. THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the fed-
22. 751 F.2d at 1135.
23. The FDIC noted the similarity between a standby letter of credit and a guarantee of an
account party's performance. In both situations a bank's obligation arises only if the account
party defaults on the underlying contract. The FDIC argued that because banks are not
empowered to act as a surety or guarantor of another party's debts, they should likewise be
prevented from issuing standby letters of credit. Id. at 1136 (construing 12 U.S.C. § 24
(1982)). The court disagreed. It noted that the FDIC had argued in diametric opposition to
this contention in previous litigation. In addition, a regulation promulgated by the
Comptroller of the Currency expressly contradicted the FDIC's argument. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.7016 (1986). Finally, the court noted that a guarantor, unlike an issuer of a standby letter
of credit, is able to assert "real defenses." Id.; see supra note 4.
The FDIC also contended that standby letters of credit are excluded from the scope of 12
U.S.C. § 1813. Its argument is as follows: Congress established an explicit assessment formula
to determine the amount each member bank must contribute to the insurance fund; premiums
are assessed relative to the amount of bank liabilities that would be absolutely due and owing
upon the bank's failure, 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (1982); a bank's liability under a standby letter of
credit is contingent on the account party's default on an underlying contract with the
beneficiary of the letter of credit; and Congress did not intend the FDIC to evaluate the risk
associated with such contingent obligations. The court, however, was unpersuaded. It noted
that subsection 4 of section 1817 addresses the obligation of member banks to report their total
liability in deposits, and explicitly refers to section 1813(1) for the definition of deposit. See 12
U.S.C. § 1817(4) (1982). Section 1813 (l)(l)'s definition of a deposit includes "a letter of credit
... on which the bank is primarily liable." 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l)(1) (1982).
Finally, the FDIC claimed that its interpretation was entitled to substantial deference,
absent compelling indications it was wrong, because it had been responsible for drafting
significant portions of the statute and had been charged with administering it. 751 F.2d at
1135. The Tenth Circuit, however, found no evidence to indicate that Congress delegated
authority to the FDIC to refine the definition of deposit. Id. Nor had the FDIC acted as if it
possessed such authority. Id. The court held that the FDIC's interpretation did not represent
the "thoroughness, validity and consistency" required for deference under Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
24. Phildelphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1135.
25. Id.
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eral deposit insurance program insured a standby letter of credit
backed by a contingent promissory note as a "deposit." The Court
reversed, holding that a standby letter of credit backed by a contin-
gent promissory note did not constitute an insured deposit.26
The Court's opinion, authored by Justice O'Connor, presented a
two-pronged rationale to support its decision. First, the Court
deferred to the FDIC's longstanding federal interpretation of the
terms "letter of credit" and "promissory note" as used in the deposit
statute. Second, the Court relied on a theory best described as
"entrustment theory."
A. The FDIC's Interpretation
The Supreme Court acknowledged the court of appeals' reliance
on state law, specifically the Uniform Commercial Code, but opted
for a federal interpretation of the statutory terms. The Court stated
that "while the note here may have been labeled a promissory note on
its face and may have been a promissory note under state law, it was
not a promissory note for purposes of the federal law set forth in 12
U.S.C. § 1813(l)(1). ' ' 27 In defining section 1813(l)(1), the Court
deferred to the FDIC's "consistent interpretation" of the statute. The
FDIC's view, that section 1813(l)(1) does not include standby letters
of credit, is detailed below.
Pursuant to the Banking Act of 1935, the FDIC promulgated
Regulation I, the precursor to secton 1813(l)(1).28 In all relevant
aspects, Regulation I was identical to section 1813(l)(1) as it exists
today. 29 Although, like section 1813(l)(1), Regulation I did not "in
terms" specifically exclude standby letters of credit, the FDIC con-
tended that it has consistently, although informally, avoided treating
standby letters backed by contingent notes as deposits.3 °
The FDIC, for example has never required the payment of insur-
26. 106 S. Ct. 1931 (1986).
27. Id. at 1934 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 133-34 (1969) (federal
law governs the definition of branch banking under the McFadden Act); D'Oench, Duhme &
Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 456 (1942) (liability on a promissory note acquired by the FDIC is
a federal question)).
28. Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684-87 (1935) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
29. 12 C.F.R. §§ 301, 301.1(d) (1939). The Banking Act of 1935 explicitly authorized the
FDIC to supplement the statutory definition. In the same year, the FDIC enacted Regulation
I and provided that a letter of credit could represent a deposit. Id. In 1960, Congress
incorporated the language from Regulation I into section 1813. See Federal Deposit Insurance
Act, amendment, Pub. L. No. 86-671, 74 Stat. 546 (1960) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(1)
(1982)).
30. Brief for Petitioner at 24, FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1931 (1986)
(No. 84-1972).
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ance premiums on these letters of credit.3 In addition, the FDIC has
never paid any insurance claims made on such letters.32 Shortly after
Regulation I was implemented, an FDIC official undertook to explain
the meaning and effect of the provision. In a discussion directed to
banking officials and auditors, the official stated:
If your letter of credit is issued by a charge against a depositor's
account or for cash and the letter of credit is reflected on your
books as a liability, you do have a deposit liability. If, on the other
hand, you merely extend a line of credit to your customer, you will
only show a contingent liablility on your books. In that event no
deposit liability has been created.33
Congress tacitly endorsed the FDIC's consistent treatment of
standby letters of credit. In 1950, when Congress revamped the fed-
eral deposit insurance program, it left Regulation I intact. 34 And, in
1960, Congress lifted language from Regulation I involving letters of
credit and promissory notes and placed it directly into what is now
section 1813(l)(1). It seems that Congress was aware of the FDIC's
general regulatory approach before enactment of the 1960 amend-
ments,3" and nothing in the legislative history of the 1960 amend-
ments suggests Congressional dissatisfaction with, or an intent to
depart from, the FDIC's approach.
Most recently, Congress enacted the Deficit Reduction Act of
1984 (DEFRA).36 One of the provisions within the Act, 26 U.S.C.
§ 103(h)(1),(2),(3)(d) provides that "[a]n obligation [i.e. an industrial
revenue bond] shall not be treated as [tax exempt] if such obligation is
federally guaranteed," 37 and that "an obligation . . . shall not be
treated as federally guaranteed merely by reason of the fact that the
proceeds of such issue are used in making loans to a financial institu-
31. Id.
32. Id. This may be due to the fact that the FDIC has never been presented with such
claims.
33. FDIC v. Irving Trust Co., 137 F. Supp. 145, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (quoting Transcript
of notes taken at a meeting of the New York Bank Auditors and Comptrollers Conference 25-
26 (Sept. 27-28, 1935)).
34. See The Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-797, 64 Stat. 873
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
35. Brief for Petitioner at 25, FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1931 (1986)
(No. 84-1972) (citing Federal Deposit Insurance Assessment: Hearings on H.R. 12465 Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1960) (statement of
William G. Loeffler); Federal Deposit Insurance Assessment: Hearings on H.R. 8916 and H.R.
8928 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 112-13 (1960) (statement of Roy L. Coburn)).
36. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
37. 26 U.S.C.A. § 103(h)(l), (2) (West 1984).
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tion or there is a guarantee by a financial institution. ' 38 Both the
House of Representatives39 and the Joint Committee on Taxation4
issued statements indicating their belief that a letter of credit exempli-
fied a financial instrument issued by a financial intermediary that
would not destroy an obligation's tax-exempt status. The implication
is that a letter of credit is not federally guaranteed, i.e., not backed by
federal deposit insurance protection. Consequently, DEFRA solidi-
fied the FDIC interpretation that a standby letter backed by a contin-
gent note is not a "deposit." From this legislative history, the Court
gleaned a distinction between contingent notes and noncontingent
notes. This distinction formed the basis of the Court's second ration-
ale in Philadelphia Gear, entrustment theory.
B. Development of Entrustment Theory
The FDIC and the deposit insurance protection program were
created shortly after the great depression as a means to restore public
confidence in the banking system.41 The amount of bank failures dur-
ing that period led to massive bank runs that culminated in President
Roosevelt declaring a national bank holiday on March 6, 1933. As a
result, Congress passed legislation creating deposit insurance. The
insurance program set out to protect "hard earnings" that individuals
and businesses entrusted to banks.42 Congress sought to ensure that
someone who placed tangible, valuable assets in a bank would not lose
them if the bank became insolvent.43 Accordingly, deposit insurance
protection is triggered only when necessary to "prevent the destruc-
tion of deposits because of bank failure and to protect depositors
against loss."'4 4  Protection is granted only to a "customer who
[entrusts] his own funds to the bank and risks their total or partial
38. Id. The purpose of the change was to prevent obligations such as municipal bonds
from receiving a double federal subsidy: deposit insurance protection and tax exemption. See
H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2a, at 1684-85, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 697, 1306-07.
39. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2a, at 1690, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 697, 1313.
40. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 2D. SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 941 (Comm.
Print 1984) (obligations are not treated as federally guaranteed merely because a financial
institution guarantees repayment of the loans other than by means of federal deposit insurance
(e.g., by a letter of credit)).
41. See generally S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6, 12-13 (1933).
42. 77 Cong. Rec. 5862 (1933) (statement of Sen. Vandenberg).
43. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1936-37.
44. S. REP. No. 1821, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1960 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3234.
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loss if the bank should suspend operations. 45
In Philadelphia Gear, the Supreme Court found that Orion did
not entrust any tangible and valuable assets to Penn Square. In reach-
ing this conclusion, the Court stated:
Orion [did not] surrender any assets unconditionally to the bank.
The bank did not credit any account of Orion's in exchange for the
promissory note, and did not treat its own assets as increased by its
acceptance of the note. The bank could not have collected on the
note from Orion unless Philadelphia Gear presented the unpaid
invoices and a draft on the letter of credit. In the absence of a
presentation by Philadephia Gear of the unpaid invoices, the prom-
issory note was a wholly contingent promise and when Penn
Square went into receivership, neither Orion nor Philadelphia
Gear had lost anything except the ability to use Penn Square to
reduce Philadelphia Gear's risk that [it] would go unpaid for a
delivery of goods to Orion.46
The Court did not believe that granting deposit insurance protection
to a contingent note would further the purpose of the deposit
statute.47
The Court's language arguably implied, however, that a noncon-
tingent note would satisfy the deposit statute.4 The authors do not
accept this implication unconditionally. A "commercial" letter of
credit, where the account party unconditionally entrusts the bank
with funds before the bank will issue the letter, would clearly justify
this conclusion. But as will be discussed below, this implication-that
a noncontingent note backing even a standby letter of credit creates
the type of entrustment Congress sought to protect-is not clear cut.
V. THE EFFECT OF Philadelphia Gear ON THE MARKETPLACE
The Supreme Court's opinion made no reference to the tremen-
dous effect a contrary decision would have had on both the banking
industry and the industrial development bond market. This might be
attributable to the fact that the Court decided to reverse and thus
found such a discussion unnecessary. Blatantly omitting recognition
of threatening consequences, however, causes speculation as to how
much influence these consequences actually had on the decision. It
45. FDIC v. Irving Trust Co., 137 F. Supp. 145, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
46. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1936-37.
47. Id. at 1939.
48. The Supreme Court explicitly referred to the FDIC's concession that deposit insurance
extends to a letter of credit backed by an uncontingent note. The Court quoted the remarks
made by Mr. Charles Rothfeld, Assistant to the Solicitor General, at oral argument: "If this
note were a fully uncontingent negotiable note that were not limited by any side agreements, it
would be a note backing a letter of credit within the meaning of the statute." Id.
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was widely recognized that a decision to affirm the Tenth Circuit's
decision would cause the transmografication of a diverse set of eco-
nomic interests. The authors contend that the Supreme Court's deci-
sion was somewhat tempered by the economic consequences involved
and later draw support for this contention through an analysis of the
Court's opinion.
A finding that deposit insurance protects standby letters of credit
backed by contingent promissory notes would have had a strong
impact on the banking industry. There are approximately 120 billion
dollars in outstanding standby letters of credit backed by promissory
notes.49 Treating such letters as deposits would result in a significant
increase in the total amount of domestic deposits held by FDIC mem-
ber banks.5" This places an immediate financial strain on banks.
While these notes, would be treated technically as deposits-thereby
requiring banks to pay additional premiums for FDIC insurance" -
these contingent notes do not give the banks any additional cash on
hand. So, the effect would be to increase the cost of issuing a standby
letter of credit thereby putting domestic intermediaries at a competi-
tive disadvantage with foreign or noninsured institutions. Alterna-
tively, banks may not be able to meet these premium requirements.
As a result, the ratio of the FDIC's insurance fund to total deposits
outstanding would decrease beyond its already dangerously low
level.5 2 This possibility is particularly worrisome because the poten-
tial for widespread bank failure is already an uncomfortable reality.53
Industrial development bonds would also have been impaired.
These bonds are exempt from federal taxation unless backed or guar-
49. The FDIC provided this estimate to the Solicitor General prior to oral argument. The
agency derived the estimate from its annual reports and published statistics on banking, and
from reports that banking institutions submitted to the FDIC. Brief for Petitioner at 28 n.22,
FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1931 (1986) (No. 84-1972).
50. The increase would be approximately 8% of the current domestic deposits held by
FDIC member banks. Id.
51. The FDIC requires each member bank to contribute a premium of 1/12 of 1% of its
total deposits to the insurance fund. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (1982). Moreover, carrying these
additional standby letters of credit on the books as deposits will increase banks' assets.
Accordingly, the FDIC will impose additional capital requirements. Brief for Petitioner at 29,
FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1931 (1986) (No. 84-1972).
52. Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1817(g), the FDIC has the discretionary authority to collect
assessments for the preceeding five year period. The FDIC suggested that this could make
member banks liable for a one-time assessment of close to 400 million dollars. Brief for
Petitioner at 28, FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp, 106 S. Ct. 1931 (1986) (No. 84-1972)
(citing 12 U.S.C. § 1817(g) (1982)).
53. The FDIC reports that from 1982 through November 1985 there were 287 bank
failures. Brief for Petitioner at 28 n.23, FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp, 106 S. Ct. 1931
(1986) (No. 84-1972).
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anteed by the federal government.5 4  Included in this category of
bonds are various municipal bonds, issued by state, city or local gov-
ernments to generate revenue for, among other things, public works
projects.55 Billions of dollars worth of these municipal bonds are
backed by standby letters of credit. If standby letters of credit were
federally insured, these municipal bonds would also be indirectly fed-
erally guaranteed. As a result, municipal bonds would lose their tax
exempt status. The effect would be to destroy the economic expecta-
tion of both the investor and the issuer and to ignore the scheme Con-
gress created by passing DEFRA.
In an attempt to temper a significant blow to the industrial devel-
opment bond market and quiet fears of those employed in related
areas, the Internal Revenue Service made clear that it would "grand-
father" in all affected bond transactions completed within the first 120
days following an affirmance by the Supreme Court.56 Notwithstand-
ing action by the IRS, there would be a significant "chilling" effect on
projects under development within the 120 day period. And subse-
quent projects dependent upon municipal bond offerings would have
to be restructured or scrapped.
VI. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. Conflict Between State and Federal Law
As a threshold matter, the Supreme Court in Philadelphia Gear
addressed whether state (i.e., the UCC) or federal law applied in
determining the character of the promissory note at issue. The Court
quickly dispensed with this issue. The Court cited D'Oench, Duhme
& Co. v. FDIC 57 and First National Bank v. Dickinson 5 8 for the prop-
osition that the term "promissory notes," as used in the federal
54. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
55. Tax exempt municipal bonds are particularly attractive as an investment option to
persons whose income places them in a high tax bracket. The interest income from these
bonds is shielded from federal taxation. The interest payments, however, are commonly less
than interest payments generated by other obligations of similar risk. Consequently, investors
in these bonds accept a tradeoff: lower yield on investment for tax avoidance on interest
income.
Issuers find municipal bonds equally atttractive because of the lower interest rate. The
interest rate represents the issuer's cost of borrowing money from the investor. Therefore, a
lower interest rate makes a particular project more affordable. Economically speaking, the only
loser in a municipal bond transaction, assuming successful completion of the underlying
project, is the federal government. It loses revenue that would otherwise be generated by
taxing the interest income.
56. See I.R.S. News Release IR-85-113 (Nov. 7, 1985).
57. 315 U.S. 447 (1942) (holding that liability on a promissory note acquired by the FDIC
is a federal question).
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deposit statute, has a federal definition. In doing so, the Court com-
pletely ignored the application of the UCC, a source lower courts,
including those in Philadelphia Gear, relied upon.59 The Court's
"choice of law" analysis, however, was incomplete. The Court itself
has developed a two-prong analysis to determine the applicable law
and the appropriate sources of law that give content to the applicable
law. The Court's blanket assertion that federal law applies errone-
ously implies that the UCC would never have a bearing on questions
of federal law. This implication is an erroneous and dangerous
precedent.
The two-prong test of United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. 60 is
instructive in determining what the proper source of law is in a partic-
ular case: "We must decide first whether federal or state law governs
the controversies; and second, if federal law applies, whether this
Court should fashion a uniform [federal] rule or incorporate state
commercial law."
6 1
Under the first prong, the Supreme Court "has consistently held
that federal law governs questions involving the rights of the United
States arising under nationwide federal programs."62 In Kimbell
Foods, the Court found that if the federal agencies under scrutiny
"derived their authority to effectuate loan transactions from specific
Acts of Congress passed in the exercise of a 'constitutional function or
58. 396 U.S. 122 (1969) (holding that federal law governs the definition of branch banking
under the McFadden Act).
59. The court in Allen v. FDIC, 599 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Tenn. 1984), addressed the same
issue presented in Philadelphia Gear: Whether a contingent obligation could give rise to an
insurable deposit. In Allen, the court held that although the promissory note was
nonnegotiable within the meaning of article 3 of the UCC, it was nevertheless a promissory
note, and therefore a "deposit" within section 1813(e)(1). Allen, 599 F. Supp. at 107 (citing
Fejta v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 412 So. 2d 155, 158 (La. App.), cert. denied, 415 So. 2d 953
(La. 1982); Leroux v. Donphan Retirement Home, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. App. 1984);
Reid v. Cramer, 24 Wash. App. 742, 744, 603 P.2d 851, 852-53 (1979)). The dissent in
Philadelphia Gear argued, however, that because such a note is nonnegotiable, it is much more
plausible to argue that Congress would not have considered it "money or its equivalent."
Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1941 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Regardless of the accuracy of
the dissent's argument, it is clear that the Tenth Circuit in Philadelphia Gear and the court in
Allen used the UCC in different ways-the note in Philadelphia Gear reflected no conditions,
while the conditions on Allen's note were reflected on the face of the note-to achieve the same
result. Although these conclusions bear unfavorably upon the use of the Code to achieve
uniformity in commercial transactions, the courts' use of the UCC as guidance was proper and
should not be abandoned in the future-a result that the Supreme Court may encourage
because of its analysis in Philadelphia Gear.
60. 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (determining whether contractual liens arising from certain
federal loan programs take precedence over private liens in the absence of a federal statute
setting priorities).
61. Id. at 718.
62. Id. at 726.
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power,' their rights, as well, should derive from a federal source."63
In Philadelphia Gear, the FDIC-with its mandate to oversee the
deposit insurance program-may be likened to the federal agencies in
Kimbell Foods because the FDIC's activities "aris[e] from and bea[r]
heavily upon a federal program."64 In defining the deposit statute,
therefore, the Philadelphia Gear Court properly turned to federal law
for guidance,65 but failed to engage the second prong of the Kimbell
Foods test
The Court's failure to address the second prong is significant
because "[c]ontroversies directly affecting the operations of federal
programs, although governed by federal law, do not inevitably require
resort to uniform rules."66 Rather, a court must engage in a balanc-
ing test to give content to a federal rule:
Whether to adopt state law or to fashion a nationwide federal
rule is a matter of judicial policy "depending upon a variety of
considerations always relevant to the nature of the specific govern-
mental interests and to the effects upon them of applying state
law."
Undoubtedly, federal programs that "by their nature are and
must be uniform in character throughout the nation" necessitate
formulation of controlling federal rules. . . . Conversely, when
there is little need for a nationally uniform body of law, state law
may be incorporated as the federal rule of decision. Apart from
considerations of uniformity, we must also determine whether
application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the
federal programs. If so, we must fashion special rules solicitous of
those federal interests. Finally, our choice of law inquiry must
consider the extent to which application of a federal rule would
disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law.67
Although the Court in Kimbell Foods was not directly presented with
the issue, federal courts have stated that the UCC is a recognized
source of federal law.68 As such, these courts have used the UCC in
63. Id. (quoting Clerfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943)).
64. Id. (quoting United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592 (1973)).
65. The Court in Philadelphia Gear found support for applying federal law in D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
66. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-9.
67. Id. at 729 (footnotes and citations omitted).
68. See United States v. Conrad Pub. Co., 589 F.2d 949, 953 (8th Cir. 1978) ("The UCC
has become the source of general commercial law .... [It] has become the source of federal
common law in the area of commercial transactions."); United States v. Crittenden, 563 F.2d
678 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971). By way of footnote,
the Hext court stated that the UCC was on its way to becoming a "truly national law of
commerce," Hext, 444 F.2d at 810 n. 19 (quoting United States v. Wegematic, 360 F.2d 674,
676 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.)), and is a "major influence on the development of common
[Vol. 41:357
FDIC V PHILADELPHIA GEAR
adjudging commercial issues of law where its use would not frustrate
the purpose of the federal program involved.69
The Court in Philadelphia Gear did not remain faithful to the
mode of analysis set forth in Kimbell Foods. If the Court had
explored the possible application of the UCC to the circumstances of
Philadelphia Gear, it would have discovered that use of the UCC
would frustrate the purpose of federal deposit insurance Instead, the
Court's blanket assertion in Philadelphia Gear that the deposit statute
is defined by federal law may erroneously signal to the courts that the
UCC should not be used in giving content to federal law.
B. The Court's Basis for Deferring to the FDIC's Interpretation of
the Deposit Statute
The Supreme Court in Philadelphia Gear concluded that the
law in the federal courts to govern cases involving government contracts and other commercial
transactions. Id. at 810 n. 17 (quoting Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17
CATH. U.L. REV. 401, 420 (1968)); see also Allen v. FDIC, 599 F. Supp. 104, 107 (E.D. Tenn.
1984).
69. In United States v. Conrad Publishing Co., the United States brought suit to collect
the balance due on a promissory note given by the Conrad Publishing Company and
subsequently assigned to the Small Business Association. 589 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1978). In
determining whether to use the UCC in giving content to the applicable federal rule, the court
stated that the "applicable provisions of the UCC did not display any aberrational features that
would defeat a legitimate federal interest and that would necessitate our resorting to federal
common law." Id. at 953. In United States v. Crittenden, the court stated that:
While the Code generally should be used to supply the content of the federal
common law rules governing suits arising from FHA transactions, in fashioning
a federal rule specific Code language and judicial interpretations need not be
followed if the federal courts deem them contrary to the weight of authority,
inconsistent with FHA operations, or undesirable as precedent.
563 F.2d 678, 690 n.19 (5th Cir. 1978). The Crittenden court adopted the test for using the
UCC as a source of federal common law from United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir.
1971).
The court also applied the Hext test in Allen v. FDIC, 599 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Tenn.
1984), a case factually similar to Philadelphia Gear. While the Allen court may have satisfied
the first prong of the Hext test in that the UCC interpretation was reflective of the weight of
authority, it clearly did not meet the second prong because the UCC definition of promissory
notes is not consistent with the purpose of federal deposit insurance-the protection of hard
assets. The Allen court's opinion that the UCC definition is consistent with the federal statute
because it instills confidence in the commercial banking system may be an unwarranted confi-
dence-one that would allow the "depositor" to become risk-neutral in placing funds into
commercial deals and not into the vaults of the bank. See Allen, 599 F. Supp. at 108. The
FDIC was not created to insure commercial risks. Reduced to its essentials, Philadelphia
Gear would have the courts insulate sellers from the evils of the marketplace by affording them
deposit insurance protection. Viewed in this light, the holding in Philadelphia Gear is not
unfair to sellers. Their after-the-fact remedy for commercial losses is a function of their suc-
cess as creditors in bankruptcy proceedings; their before-the-fact remedy is a function of their
success at adjusting the price of the goods sold to reflect the potential risks involved in the
deal.
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FDIC's position that unfunded letters of credit are not deposits was
longstanding and consistent.70 This finding was a critical step in the
Court's ultimate conclusion because it allowed the Court to defer to
the FDIC's interpretation of what constitutes a deposit. "When the
statute giving rise to the longstanding interpretation has been re-
enacted without pertinent change, the Congressional failure to revise
or repeal the agency's interpretation is pervasive evidence that the
interpretation is the one intended by Congress.7" Because the Court
believed that the FDIC was the proper rulemaking authority in the
instant matter, the Court felt it could judicially recognize the FDIC's
view without impermissibly intruding into the congressional sphere of
authority.
Characterization of the FDIC's interpretation of the deposit stat-
ute as longstanding and consistent, however, is tenuous. Moreover,
even if one were to acknowledge that the FDIC interpretation is long-
standing, deference in Philadelphia Gear was improper in light of
standards that the Court previously enunciated to determine the pro-
priety of deferring to an executive agency. It may be, however, that
the Court created a new standard for deferring to an executive
agency's views. Given the unique set of circumstances in Philadelphia
Gear, it is difficult to predict what combination of facts will similarly
persuade a Court to defer to an executive agency's statutory interpre-
tation in the future.
The Court's own dicta appears to support the claim that the
FDIC's interpretation of the deposit statute is not longstanding. The
Court, in scrutinizing the legislative history of the deposit statute,
concluded that no distinction between funded and unfunded letters of
credit could be gleaned.72 Because the issue of whether the FDIC's
interpretation is longstanding is inextricably tied to the standards for
determining deference, the Court's creation of a lower deference
threshold clears up any perceived inconsistency in the Court's conclu-
sion that the FDIC interpretation is longstanding. That is, the Court
could support the FDIC's interpretation without regard to the legisla-
tive history of the deposit statute by scrutinizing the FDIC's behavior
over the last fifty years.
The linchpin of the Court's decision to defer to the FDIC was
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council Inc.73 The
Court cited Chevron U.S.A. for the proposition that "in the circum-
70. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1937.
71. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974)).
72. Id. at 1936-37.
73. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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stances of this case 'considerable weight ... should be accorded to an
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is
entrusted to administer.' "I' Although we are not told what "circum-
stances in" Philadelphia Gear triggered the use of the Chevron U.S.A.
test, it is clear that the facts in Philadelphia Gear should not have
triggered such application. In Chevron U.S.A., the Court stated that
deference "is particularly justified if Congress has explicitly left a gap
for the agency to fill as then 'there is an express delegation of authority
to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regula-
tion.' 7 With respect to the deposit statute at issue in Philadelphia
Gear, Congress did not expressly delgate any authority to the FDIC.76
Thus, the Court applied the Chevron U.S.A. test under a lower thresh-
old then previously allowed. It was important for the Court to
develop this new threshold because deference would not have been
appropriate under previous Supreme Court standards.
Under United States. v. Rutherford,77 "once an agency's statu-
tory construction has been 'fully brought to the attention of the public
and the Congress,' and the latter has not sought to alter that interpre-
tation although it has amended the statute in other respects, then pre-
sumably the legislative intent has been correctly discerned. ' 78  As
noted above,7 9 the FDIC has never distinguished between funded and
unfunded letters of credit.8" For this reason, the FDIC's statutory
interpretation has not been fully brought to the attention of the public
and Congress. The Court's decision to defer to the FDIC was, there-
74. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1938-39 (emphasis added).
75. Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 843-44 (emphasis added).
76. In fact, the FDIC only cited 12 U.S.C § 1813(l)(5) for the proposition that Congress
delegated a power of interpretation to the agency. Section 1813(l)(5) provides that the FDIC
may define a deposit for "such other obligations of a bank as the Board of Directors, after
consultation with the Comptroller of the Currency and the Board of Governors of the Federal
Rerserve System, shall find and prescribe by regulation to be deposit liabilities by general
usage." 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l)(5) (1982) (emphasis added).
This provision only grants power to the FDIC to define "other obligations" not
enumerated in section 1813(l)(l)-(4). The provision is a catch-all provision. It does not,
however, grant to the FDIC a power of interpretation for section 1813(l)(1). Indeed, because
Congress expressly granted the FDIC such power under 1813(l)(5), Congress's silence with
regard to section 1813(1)(1) indicates its desire not to grant the FDIC such power under that
section. Against this backdrop of legislative history, the Supreme Court's creation of a lower
deference threshold-one that focuses on an agency's behavior-is significant.
77. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
78. Id. at 554 (emphasis added).
79. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
80. See Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1936 ("The reports on the 1935 amendments
presented the definition of 'deposits' without any specific comment .... The legislative history
of the 1950 amendments is similarly unhelpful. . . . The Committee Reports on the 1960
amendments likewise give no indication that the amendments' phrasing was meant to effect
any fundamental changes in the definition of deposit ... ").
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fore, improper under Rutherford. The case of Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Sloan81 is also instructive on this point.
In Sloan, the SEC had issued a series of conservative ten-day
orders suspending trading in the common stock of a corporation. As
did the FDIC in Philadelphia Gear, the SEC claimed that its con-
struction of the statute was entitled to deference, as it had adminis-
tered the statute and made its views known to Congress. The
Supreme Court rejected the SEC's claim, stating:
Here the administrators, so far as we are advised, made no refer-
ence at all to their present construction of Section 12(k) to the
Congress which drafted the "enabling legislation" here in ques-
tion-the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. They made known to
at least one committee their subsequent construction of that sec-
tion 29 years later, at a time when the attention of the Committee
and of the Congress was focused on issues not directly related to
the one presently before the court .... We are extremely hesitant
to presume general congressional awareness of the Commission's
construction based only upon a few isolated statements in the
thousands of pages of legislative documents. That language in a
Committee Report, without additional indication of more wide-
spread congressional awareness, is simply not sufficient to invoke
the presumption in a case such as this.82
Because the legislative history more strongly supported the SEC's
contentions in Sloan, the Court's rejection of the deference argument
should have applied with equal force in Philadelphia Gear.
Moreover, the Court in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 83 enunciated
specific standards under which an agency's construction may be
credited: The weight of such an agency judgment in a particular case
will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro-
nouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.84 Under the Skidmore test, the Philadelphia
Gear Court's deference to the FDIC was improper.85
81. 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
82. Id. at 120-21.
83. 323 U.S. 134 (1934).
84. Id. at 140.
85. One of the prongs of the Skidmore standard requires that the agency consistently
advance its statutory construction approach. On this point, the Court did not acknowledge
Philadelphia Gear's argument that "the [FDIC's] position before the Court [was] at odds with
its earlier affirmative statements on the issue, both in the instant case and in its posted
regulations. Before the district court, the FDIC made no claim of any longstanding
administrative interpretation; before the court of appeals, it maintained that it has consistently
excluded all standby letters of credit from deposit insurance coverage, [and] not merely
,unfunded' standby letters as it now claims." Brief for Respondent at 29, FDIC v.
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The Court in Philadelphia Gear was unable to find support in the
legislative history of the deposit statute for the FDIC's statutory
interpretation. Not surprisingly, the Court could not find support for
its deference to the FDIC in previous cases either. 86 Yet, the Court
still deferred to the FDIC. The Court claimed that although there
was no "express regulation excluding a standby letter of credit backed
by a contingent promissory note from the definition of 'deposit' in 12
U.S.C. § 1813(l)(1), that exclusion by the FDIC is nonetheless long-
Philadelphia Gear Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1931 (1986) (No. 84-1972) (citing Brief of FDIC in its
Corporate Capacity Before the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit at 6, FDIC v.
Philadelphia Gear Corp., 751 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1984) (Nos. 84-1901, 84-2007)).
Securities Industry Association v. Federal Reserve Board, 104 S. Ct. 2983 (1985), appears
to support Philadelphia Gear's position that the FDIC's statement "strongly counsels against
deferring to the FDIC." Brief for Respondent at 30, FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 106 S.
Ct. 1931 (1986) (No. 84-1972). In Securities Industry Association, the Federal Reserve Board
changed the statutory construction argument that it had adopted during administrative
hearings. The Court stated: "[t]o the extent that the Board has changed its position from that
adopted at the administrative level, its interpretation is entitled to less weight." 104 S. Ct. at
2983-84 (emphasis added). Of course, the Philadelphia Gear Court could still have deferred to
the FDIC under Securities Industry Association because inconsistent statutory construction
arguments are only "entitled to less weight."
86. In addition to Rutherford and Skidmore, the FDIC cited to 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813 (1)(5),
1819 Tenth, and 12 C.F.R. § 330 to support its contention that Congress has "plainly
indicated that the FDIC's interpretation of Section 1813 must be accorded great deference."
Brief for Petitioner at 22, FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1931 (1986) (No. 84-
1972). The FDIC's reliance on these statutes and regulations, however, was misplaced.
Section 1813 (1)(5) defines deposits as:
such other obligations of a bank as the Board of Directors, after consultation
with the Comptroller of the Currency and the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System shall find and prescribe by regulation to be deposit
liabilities by general usage: Provided further, That any obligation of a bank
which is payable only at an office of the bank located outside of the States of the
United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa,
and the Virgin Islands, shall not be a deposit for any of the purposes of this
chapter or be included as part of total deposits for any of the purposes of this
chapter or be included as part of the total deposits or of an insured deposit.
12 U.S.C. § 1813(l)(5) (1982). This section merely grants the FDIC the power to create new
definitions of deposits and does not grant the FDIC power to interpret the meaning of the
existing definitions of deposits such as the section 1813 (1)(1) definition at issue in Philadelphia
Gear.
Similarly, 12 U.S.C. § 1819 Tenth merely grants the FDIC the power to promulgate rules
or regulations "as it may deem necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter or any
other law" that the FDIC administers. 12 U.S.C. § 1819 Tenth (1982). Section 1819 Tenth
does not grant the FDIC the power to interpret existing rules. Moreover, in Philadelphia Gear
the FDIC was not prescribing a rule or regulation, but was advancing an interpretation of
section 1813 (1)(1). As such, the FDIC was not using the proper vehicle to refine the deposit
statute.
Finally, 12 C.F.R. § 330 is entitled Clarification and Definition of Deposit Insurance Cov-
erage. Although this title would appear to grant the FDIC the authority to clarify and define
the deposit statute, nowhere in the section is there mention of any such authority. 12 C.F.R.
§ 330 (1985).
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standing and consistent."87 Furthermore, the Court went on to note
that the FDIC's "contemporaneous understanding" that unfunded
letters of credit are not deposits has been fortified by its behavior over
the last few decades. Indeed, the FDIC has "never charged deposit
insurance premiums on standby letters of credit backed by contingent
promissory notes."88
As neither legislative history nor case law supported deference to
the FDIC, the Court must have created a new standard to determine
when to defer to executive agencies. That new standard is a function
of all the circumstances of Philadelphia Gear. Although the new stan-
dard was neither clearly articulated nor expounded upon by the
Court, the FDIC's informal, yet apparently consistent treatment of
unfunded letters of credit-as evidenced as much through indirect
examples as through direct proof-was enough to convince the Court
to defer to the FDIC in the instant matter. Given the unique circum-
stances in Philadelphia Gear, courts will be hard-pressed to determine
what combination of facts will trigger the use of the Supreme Court's
new deference standard.
The Court could characterize the informal practices and beliefs
of the FDIC and defer to that viewpoint because it knew that view-
point was consistent with the legislative purpose of federal deposit
insurance. The Court's failure to properly address the deference
issue, however, does not mean that the result in Philadelphia Gear is
incorrect. Indeed, the Court properly discerned the legislative pur-
pose of federal deposit insurance and read qualifications into the
deposit statute in order to allow modern-day banking practices to
remain faithful to the spirit of the statute. The analysis in this Note
challenges the Court's mode of analysis, and questions whether the
Supreme Court was the proper institution to refine the deposit statute.
Notwithstanding such good intentions on the part of the Court vis-a-
vis the economic consequences involved, one has to question whether
attaining the right result in the case may ultimately have adverse
effects on the judicial system. Although the unique circumstances of
Philadelphia Gear may never occur again, we should look for what
creative minds might make of Philadelphia Gear in the future.
The Phildelphia Gear Court has allowed an executive agency to
refine the meaning of a statute through its own informal, independent
actions and behavior over a long period of time. By allowing execu-
tive agencies to change the thrust of statutes through their own insti-
tutional responses, the courts would be creating very powerful,
87. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1938.
88. Id.
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decentralized pockets of power.8 9
It would appear, then, that a court's reliance on an agency's reac-
tion to a statute--carried out informally and quietly-is not the
proper inquiry, especially where the legislative purpose is not easily
defined and is useless as a landmark in the deference analysis. In this
light, the Supreme Court's Rutherford and Skidmore standards
appear to be the appropriate vehicle for adjudging deference issues
and for properly determining a shift in rulemaking authority. While
the unusual factual circumstances in Philadelphia Gear may have
warranted a departure from those standards, such a departure may in
the future promote unusual, if not dangerous, results.
C. Entrustment- Three Commercial Paradigms
The Court has identified the congressional purpose in promulgat-
ing the deposit insurance protection fund as to protect those that
entrust funds to a bank. 90 Although the Supreme Court spent consid-
erable time addressing the importance of entrustment, the critical
question is what kinds of financial instruments will create entrust-
ment. Whether a letter of credit creates entrustment depends upon
the type of entrustment backing the letter of credit.
It is clear from the Supreme Court's opinion that a contingent
note does not constitute the entrustment of funds to the issuing
bank.9" But the inquiry into the function of deposit insurance protec-
tion is incomplete if analysis is limited to the posture of contingent
notes. Unconditional notes must also be analyzed. Effective guidance
to those engaging in future standby letter of credit transactions
depends on such an analysis because these are the notes that may trig-
ger deposit insurance protection. Because the Supreme Court's opin-
ion did not explicitly address this issue, it is not clear whether an
unconditional note automatically triggers deposit insurance
protection.
The court of appeals and the FDIC took the same position on
this issue. They maintain that execution of an unconditional note cre-
ates the requisite entrustment under the deposit statute. As noted, the
court of appeals held that because Orion's promissory note was nego-
tiable on its face, it was unconditional and deserved deposit insurance
protection. The court's analysis indicated its belief that a finding of
89. Cf I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a one-house veto
of an executive agency's actions). If Congress disagreed with an executive agency's actions, its
ability to control those actions might be more difficult in light of Chadha.
90. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
91. Id.
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negotiability automatically triggered deposit insurance protection. It
never discussed, or even acknowledged, the possibility that negotiabil-
ity did not presuppose entrustment. The FDIC takes a corresponding
position. While it did not agree that Orion's note was a negotiable
instrument, it never disputed, and later conceded, that an uncondi-
tional note would have required it to pay Philadelphia Gear from the
deposit insurance fund.92
It is the contention of the authors that, given the purpose of the
deposit statute, entrustment does not exist simply because an uncon-
ditional note has been executed. Only "funded" unconditional notes
will suffice. In other words, deposit insurance protection should
attach only to unconditional notes upon which the bank has received
payment. Although the Supreme Court opinion is silent with respect
to this issue, the paradigms detailed below lead to the conclusion that
the "unconditional" notes referred to in the Court's opinion are
promissory notes that have been "funded."
1. THE CONDITIONAL PROMISSORY NOTE
a. Before Buyer's Payment
When a buyer executes a promissory note in favor of a bank, the
buyer records the note as a liability on its books. The buyer probably
has every intention of making payment on it. Accordingly, the seller
has no reason to expect the buyer to default and will not present docu-
ments to the bank seeking payment until that time. Consequently, the
bank has no reason to demand payment on the note. If the bank
becomes insolvent at any time prior to payment on the letter of credit,
no entrustment will have occurred. As the bank's payment is contin-
gent on the buyer's default, the buyer therefore will not have
entrusted funds to the bank prior to its default on the underlying
agreement. No entrustment means no deposit insurance protection.
b. After Buyer's Nonpayment
The buyer may refuse to make payment for reasons other than
insolvency. For example, the seller may send nonconforming goods
or the buyer may allege that there was fraud in the transaction. When
the buyer refuses to pay, the seller will turn to the bank for payment.
If the bank is insolvent, it, through a trustee or receiver, will turn to
the buyer for payment on the note. If the trustee collects the funds,
the funds may or may not be earmarked for the seller. Only if the
funds are earmarked for the seller will the seller not seek deposit
92. See supra note 45.
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insurance. If the bank trustee does not earmark them for the seller,
the seller will seek insurance. If the seller seeks deposit insurance the
bank would be without funding on the letter of credit during the
"gap" period-the period between the time it became insolvent and
the time it collected the funds from the buyer. But when the seller
initially presents documents to the bank, the buyer will not have
entrusted anything of value to the bank. Deposit insurance protection
should not be activated by a post-hoc decision by the buyer to com-
plete his contractual obligation. If the buyer defaults because of insol-
vency, the bank will not collect the funds, and there will be no "gap"
period. There will never have been an argument for entrustment.
Therefore, the transaction will be beyond the ambit of deposit insur-
ance protection.
2. CASH
Supporting a letter of credit by transferring cash or hard assets to
the bank in the amount of the letter is the surest way to satisfy the
deposit statute. The question is whether entrustment may occur in
the standby letter of credit context when a promissory note backs the
letter or whether entrustment is limited to cash transactions.
3. THE UNCONDITIONAL PROMISSORY NOTE
It is true, as the FDIC conceded, that an unconditional note is
almost equivalent to having cash or hard assets in hand-the bank is
free to transfer the note for value. In addition, the bank can: (1) off-
set the note against any deposit liabilities it owes the buyer; and
(2) attempt to accelerate the note and realize the note's value in cash.
The authors contend that an unconditional note alone, without
more, fails to create entrustment of assets within the meaning of the
deposit statute. Although transferring the note to a third party for
the approximate face value allows the bank to generate cash, it none-
theless fails to constitute an entrustment of funds because the account
party has not put any of its assets at risk. If the bank shut its doors
after it sold the conditional note, the account party would not lose
anything: Nothing ventured, nothing lost, no entrustment.
On the other hand, if the unconditional note was actually accel-
erated or offset against another liability of the bank to the account
party (e.g., a time-deposit), entrustment will have occurred. In these
transactions the account party has put its own assets at risk, and put-
ting assets at risk is what Congress intended to protect when it
promulgated the deposit statute. An unconditional note, therefore,
must be "funded" in some way to create the kind of entrustment iden-
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tified by Congress in the early 1930's. The extra step-to actually
fund-must be taken: The ability to take it, by offsetting or accelerat-
ing, is not enough.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Philadelphia Gear, the Supreme Court noted that a letter of
credit backed by an unconditional promissory note would trigger
insurance protection. The Supreme Court's use of the term "uncondi-
tional promissory notes" is synonymous with "funded promissory
notes." Only in this way could the Court achieve its desire to insure
only the hard assets of depositors and remain faithful to the federal
deposit insurance statute. The Court's decision illustrates the errone-
ous assumptions underlying the court of appeals's analysis, namely
that negotiability presupposes entrustment. Moreover, it appears that
the FDIC got more than it bargained for in Philadelphia Gear. The
FDIC would have been satisfied with the Supreme Court's explicit
holding respecting contingent notes, but also got dicta addressing
unconditional notes. In fact, this dicta, as interpreted by the authors,
goes beyond the arguments posited by the FDIC.
The Supreme Court's decision staved off potential adverse conse-
quences for various financial markets, but it is ironic that the Court
did not clearly state its holding for the benefit of this same audience.
The Supreme Court should have told the financial community which
transactions are protected by the FDIC and which ones are not.
Clearly, this knowledge would help businessmen shape the structure
of their letter of credit transactions. As it stands, the Supreme
Court's decision may cause needless confusion in the financial mar-
kets. Moreover, the Philadelphia Gear dissent is correct in recogniz-
ing that the decision will force businessmen to bear the difficult task of
distinguising between different types of letters of credit when structur-
ing their deals. 93
What is certain is that the Court, in its struggle to narrow the
definition of promissory notes, has essentially read this term out of the
deposit statute. If one must "fund" the promissory note in order for it
to be considered a deposit, there is no need for the promissory note in
the first place. This is not to say that unfunded unconditional notes
should not, or will, not be used in letter of credit transactions. A legal
relationship will still be created between the buyer and the bank. The
93. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1941 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ramification, however, is that the FDIC will not guarantee the com-
mercial transaction through deposit insurance.
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